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Abstract
We propose an intriguingly simple method for
the construction of adversarial images in the
black-box setting. In constrast to the white-box
scenario, constructing black-box adversarial im-
ages has the additional constraint on query bud-
get, and efficient attacks remain an open prob-
lem to date. With only the mild assumption of
continuous-valued confidence scores, our highly
query-efficient algorithm utilizes the following
simple iterative principle: we randomly sample a
vector from a predefined orthonormal basis and
either add or subtract it to the target image. De-
spite its simplicity, the proposed method can be
used for both untargeted and targeted attacks –
resulting in previously unprecedented query effi-
ciency in both settings. We demonstrate the effi-
cacy and efficiency of our algorithm on several
real world settings including the Google Cloud
Vision API. We argue that our proposed algorithm
should serve as a strong baseline for future black-
box attacks, in particular because it is extremely
fast and its implementation requires less than 20
lines of PyTorch code.
1. Introduction
As machine learning systems become prevalent in numerous
application domains, the security of these systems in the
presence of malicious adversaries becomes an important
area of research. Many recent studies have shown that de-
cisions output by machine learning models can be altered
arbitrarily with imperceptible changes to the input (Carlini
& Wagner, 2017b; Szegedy et al., 2014). These attacks
on machine learning models can be categorized by the ca-
pabilities of the adversary. White-box attacks require the
adversary to have complete knowledge of the target model,
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whereas black-box attacks require only queries to the target
model that may return complete or partial information.
Seemingly all models for classification of natural images
are susceptible to white-box attacks (Athalye et al., 2018),
which indicates that natural images tend to be close to de-
cision boundaries learned by machine learning classifiers.
Although often misunderstood as a property of neural net-
works (Szegedy et al., 2014), the vulnerability towards ad-
versarial examples is likely an inevitability of classifiers in
high-dimensional spaces with most data distributions (Fawzi
et al., 2018; Shafahi et al., 2018).
If adversarial examples (almost) always exist, attacking a
classifier turns into a search problem within a small volume
around a target image. In the white-box scenario, this search
can be guided effectively with gradient descent (Szegedy
et al., 2014; Carlini & Wagner, 2017b; Madry et al., 2017).
However, the black-box threat model is more applicable in
many scenarios. Here, queries to the model may incur a
significant cost of both time and money, and the number
of black-box queries made to the model therefore serves as
an important metric of efficiency for the attack algorithm.
Attacks that are too costly, or are easily defeated by query
limiting, pose less of a security risk than efficient attacks.
To date, the average number of queries performed by the
best known black-box attacks remains high despite a large
amount of recent work in this area (Chen et al., 2017; Bren-
del et al., 2017; Cheng et al., 2018; Guo et al., 2018; Tu
et al., 2018; Ilyas et al., 2018a). The most efficient and
complex attacks still typically require upwards of tens or
hundreds of thousands of queries. A method for query effi-
cient black-box attacks has remained an open problem.
Machine learning services such as Clarifai or Google Cloud
Vision only allow API calls to access the model’s predic-
tions and fall therefore in the black-box category. These
services do not release any internal details such as train-
ing data and model parameters; however, their predictions
return continuous-valued confidence scores. In this paper
we propose a simple, yet highly efficient black-box attack
that exploits these confidence scores using a very simple
intuition: if the distance to a decision boundary is small, we
don’t have to be too careful about the exact direction along
which we traverse towards it. Concretely, we repeatedly
pick a random direction among a pre-specified set of orthog-
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onal search directions, use the confidence scores to check if
it is pointing towards or away from the decision boundary,
and perturb the image by adding or subtracting the vector
from the image. Each update moves the image further away
from the original image and towards the decision boundary.
We provide some theoretical insight on the efficacy of our
approach and evaluate various orthogonal search subspaces.
Similar to Guo et al. (2018), we observe that restricting the
search towards the low frequency end of the discrete cosine
transform (DCT) basis is particularly query efficient. Fur-
ther, we demonstrate empirically that our approach achieves
a similar success rate to state-of-the-art black-box attack
algorithms, however with an unprecedented low number
of black-box queries. Due to its simplicity — it can be
implemented in PyTorch in under 20 lines of code1 — we
consider our method a new and perhaps surprisingly strong
baseline for adversarial image attacks, and we refer to it as
Simple Black-box Attack (SimBA).
2. Background
The study of adversarial examples concerns with the robust-
ness of a machine learning model to small changes in the
input. The task of image classification is defined as success-
fully predicting what a human sees in an image. Naturally,
changes to the image that are so tiny that they are impercepti-
ble to humans should not affect the label and prediction. We
can formalize such a robustness property as follows: given
a model h and some input-label pair (x, y) on which the
model correctly classifies h(x) = y, h is said to be ρ-robust
with respect to perceptibility metric d(·, ·) if
h(x′) = y ∀x′ ∈ {x′ | d(x′,x) ≤ ρ }.
The metric d is often approximated by the L0, L2 and L∞
distances to measure the degree of visual dissimilarity be-
tween the clean input x and the perturbed input x′. Fol-
lowing (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016; Moosavi-Dezfooli
et al., 2017), for the remainder of this paper we will use
d(x,x′) = ‖x − x′‖2 as the perceptibility metric unless
specified otherwise. Geometrically, the region of impercep-
tible changes is therefore defined to be a small hypersphere
with radius ρ, centered around the input image x.
Recently, many studies have shown that learned models
admit directions of non-robustness even for very small val-
ues of ρ (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016; Carlini & Wagner,
2017b). Fawzi et al. (2018); Shafahi et al. (2018) verified
this claim theoretically by showing that adversarial exam-
ples are inherent in high-dimensional spaces. These findings
motivate the problem of finding adversarial directions δ that
alter the model’s decision for a perturbed input x′ = x+ δ.
1https://github.com/cg563/
simple-blackbox-attack
Targeted and untargeted attacks. The simplest success
condition for the adversary is to change the original correct
prediction of the model to an arbitrary class, i.e., h(x′) 6= y.
This is known as an untargeted attack. In contrast, a targeted
attack aims to construct x′ such that h(x′) = y′ for some
chosen target class y′. For the sake of brevity, we will focus
on untargeted attacks in our discussion, but all arguments in
our paper are also applicable to targeted attacks. We include
experimental results for both attack types in section 4.
Loss minimization. Since the model outputs discrete de-
cisions, finding adversarial perturbations to change the
model’s prediction is, at first, a discrete optimization prob-
lem. However, it is often useful to define a surrogate loss
`y(·) that measures the degree of certainty that the model h
classifies the input as class y. The adversarial perturbation
problem can therefore be formulated as the following con-
strained continuous optimization problem of minimizing the
model’s classification certainty:
min
δ
`y(x+ δ) subject to ‖δ‖2 < ρ.
When the model h outputs probabilities ph(· | x) associ-
ated with each class, one commonly used adversarial loss
is the probability of class y: `y(x′) = ph(y | x′), essen-
tially minimizing the probability of a correct classification.
For targeted attacks towards label y′ a common choice is
`y′(x
′) = −ph(y′ | x′), essentially maximizing the proba-
bility of a misclassification as class y′.
White-box threat model. Depending on the application
domain, the attacker may have various degrees of knowl-
edge about the target model h. Under the white-box threat
model, the classifier h is provided to the adversary. In this
scenario, a powerful attack strategy is to perform gradient
descent on the adversarial loss `y(·), or an approximation
thereof. To ensure that the changees remain imperceptible,
one can control the perturbation norm, ‖δ‖2, by early stop-
ping (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Kurakin et al., 2016) or by
including the norm directly as a regularizer or constraint
into the loss optimization (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b).
Black-box threat model. Arguably, for many real-world
settings the white-box assumptions may be unrealistic. For
instance, the model h may be exposed to the public as an
API, allowing only queries on inputs. Such scenarios are
common when attacking machine learning cloud services
such as Google Cloud Vision and Clarifai. This black-box
threat model is much more challenging for the adversary,
since gradient information may not be used to guide the
finding of the adversarial direction δ, and each query to the
model incurs a time and monetary cost. Thus, the adver-
sary is tasked with an additional goal of minimizing the
number of black-box queries to h while succeeding in con-
structing an imperceptible adversarial perturbation. With a
slight abuse of notation this poses a modified constrained
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Algorithm 1 SimBA in Pseudocode
1: procedure SIMBA(x, y,Q, )
2: δ = 0
3: p = ph(y | x)
4: while py = maxy′ py′ do
5: Pick randomly without replacement: q ∈ Q
6: for α ∈ {,−} do
7: p′ = ph(y | x+ δ + αq)
8: if p′y < py then
9: δ = δ + αq
10: p = p′
11: break
return δ
optimization problem:
min
δ
`y(x+ δ) subject to: ‖δ‖2 < ρ, queries ≤ B
where B is some fixed budget for the number of queries
allowed during the optimization. For iterative methods that
query, the budget B constrains the number of iterations the
algorithm may take, hence requiring that the attack algo-
rithm converges to a solution very quickly.
3. A Simple Black-box Attack
We assume we have some image x which a black-box neural
network, h, classifies h(x) = y with predicted confidence or
output probability ph(y | x). Our goal is to find a small per-
turbation δ such that the prediction h(x+ δ) 6= y. Although
gradient information is absent in the black-box setting, we
argue that the presence of output probabilities can serve as
a strong proxy to guide the search for adversarial images.
Algorithm. The intuition behind our method is simple (see
pseudo-code in Algorithm 1): for any direction q and some
step size , one of x + q or x − q is likely to decrease
ph(y | x). We therefore repeatedly pick random directions
q and either add or subtract them. To minimize the number
of queries to h(·) we always first try adding q. If this de-
creases the probability ph(y | x) we take the step, otherwise
we try subtracting q. This procedure requires between 1.4
and 1.5 queries per update on average (depending on the
data set and target model). Our proposed method – Simple
Black-box Attack (SimBA) – takes as input the target image
label pair (x, y), a set of orthonormal candidate vectors Q
and a step-size  > 0. For simplicity we pick q ∈ Q uni-
formly at random. To guarantee maximum query efficiency,
we ensure that no two directions cancel each other out and
diminish progress, or amplify each other and increase the
norm of δ disproportionately. For this reason we pick q
without replacement and restrict all vectors in Q to be or-
thonormal. As we show later, this results in a guaranteed
perturbation norm of ‖δ‖2 =
√
T after T updates. The
only hyper-parameters of SimBA are the set of orthogonal
search vectors Q and the step size .
Cartesian basis. A natural first choice for the set of or-
thogonal search directions Q is the standard basis Q = I ,
which corresponds to performing our algorithm directly in
pixel space. Essentially each iteration we are increasing
or decreasing one color of a single randomly chosen pixel.
Attacking in this basis corresponds to an L0-attack, where
the adversary aims to change as few pixels as possible.
Discrete cosine basis. Recent work has discovered that
random noise in low frequency space is more likely to be
adversarial (Guo et al., 2018). To exploit this fact, we fol-
low Guo et al. (2018) and propose to exploit the discrete
cosine transform (DCT). The discrete cosine transform is
an orthonormal transformation that maps signals in a 2D
image space Rd×d to frequency coefficients corresponding
to magnitudes of cosine wave functions. In what follows,
we will refer to the set of orthonormal frequencies extracted
by the DCT asQDCT. While the full set of directionsQDCT
contains d× d frequencies, we keep only a fraction r of the
lowest frequency directions in order to make the adversarial
perturbation in the low frequency space.
General basis. In general, we believe that our attack can
be used with any orthonormal basis, provided that the basis
vectors can be sampled efficiently. This is especially chal-
lenging for high resolution datasets such as ImageNet since
each orthonormal basis vector has dimensionality d × d.
Iterative sampling methods such as Gram-Schmidt process
cannot be used due to linear memory cost in the number of
sampled vectors. Thus, we choose to evaluate our attack
using only the standard basis vectors and DCT basis vectors
for their efficiency and natural suitability to images.
Learning rate . Given any set of search directionsQ, some
directions may decrease ph(y | x) more than others. Further,
it is possible for the output probability ph(y | x + q) to
be non-monotonic in . In Figure 1, we plot the relative de-
crease in probability as a function of  for randomly sampled
search directions in both pixel space and the DCT space.
The probabilities correspond to prediction on an ImageNet
validation sample by a ResNet-50 model. This figure high-
lights an illuminating result: the probability ph(y | x± q)
decreases monotonically in  with surprising consistency
(across random images and vectors q)! Although some di-
rections eventually increase the true class probability, the
expected change in this probability is negative with a rel-
atively steep slope. This means that our algorithm is not
overly sensitive to the choice of  and the iterates will de-
crease the true class probability quickly. The figure also
shows that search in the DCT space tends to lead to steeper
descent directions than pixel space. As we show in the
next section, we can tightly bound the final L2-norm of the
perturbation given a choice of  and maximum number of
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Figure 1. Plot of the change in predicted class probability when a randomly picked basis direction q is added or subtracted (whichever
decreases the loss more) with step size . The left plot shows pixel space and the right plot shows low frequency DCT space. The average
change (purple line) is almost linear in  with the slope being steeper when the direction is sampled in DCT space. Further, 98% of the
directions sampled in DCT space have either −q or q descending, while only 73% are descending in pixel space.
steps T , so the choice of  depends primarily on budget
considerations with respect to ‖δ‖2.
Budget considerations. By exploiting the orthonormality
of the basis Q we can bound the norm of δ tightly. Each
iteration a basis vector is either added, subtracted, or dis-
carded (if neither direction yields a reduction of the output
probability.) Let αi ∈ {−, 0, } denote the sign of the
search direction chosen at step t, so
δt+1 = δt + αtqt.
We can recursively expand δt+1 = δt + αtqt. In general,
the final perturbation δT after T steps can be written as a
sum of these individual search directions:
δT =
T∑
t=1
αtqt.
Since the directions qt are orthogonal, q>t qt′ = 0 for any
t 6= t′. We can therefore compute the L2-norm of the
adversarial perturbation:
‖δT ‖22 =
∥∥∥∥∥
T∑
t=1
αtqt
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
=
T∑
t=1
‖αiqt‖22 =
T∑
t=1
α2t ‖qt‖22
≤ T2.
Here, the second equality follows from the orthogonality of
qt and qt′ , and the last inequality is tight if all queries result
in a step of either  or −. Thus the adversarial perturbation
has L2-norm at most
√
T after T iterations. This result
holds for any orthonormal basis (e.g. QDCT).
Our analysis highlights an important trade-off: for query-
limited scenarios, we may reduce the number of iterations
by setting  higher, incurring higher perturbation L2-norm.
If a low norm solution is more desirable, reducing  will
allow quadratically more queries at the same L2-norm. A
more thorough theoretical analysis of this trade-off could
improve query efficiency.
4. Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate our attack against a compre-
hensive list of competitive black-box attack algorithms: the
Boundary Attack (Brendel et al., 2017), Opt attack (Cheng
et al., 2018), Low Frequency Boundary Attack (LFBA) (Guo
et al., 2018), AutoZOOM (Tu et al., 2018), the QL attack
(Ilyas et al., 2018a), and the Bandits-TD attack (Ilyas et al.,
2018b). There are three dimensions to evaluate black-box
adversarial attacks on: how often the optimization problem
finds a feasible point (success rate), how many queries were
required (B), and the resulting perturbation norms (ρ).
4.1. Setup
We first evaluate our method on ImageNet. We sample a set
of 1000 images from the ImageNet validation set that are
initially classified correctly to avoid artificially inflating the
success rate. Since the predicted probability is available for
every class, we minimize the probability of the correct class
as adversarial loss in untargeted attacks, and maximize the
probability of the target class in targeted attacks. We sample
a target class uniformly at random for all targeted attacks.
Next, we evaluate SimBA in the real-world setting of at-
tacking the Google Cloud Vision API. Due to the extreme
budget required by baselines that might cost up to $150 per
image2, here we only compare to LFBA, which we found to
be the most query efficient baseline.
2The Google API charges $1.50 for 1000 image queries.
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Figure 2. Comparison of success rate and average L2-norm versus number of model queries for untargeted (left) and targeted (right)
attacks. Horizontal axis shows number of model queries. The increase in success rate for SimBA and SimBA-DCT are dramatically faster
than that of QL-attack in both untargeted and targeted scenarios. Both methods also achieve lower average L2-norm than QL-attack. Note
that although SimBA-DCT has faster initial convergence, its final success rate is lower than SimBA.
In our experiments, we limit SimBA and SimBA-DCT to
at most T = 10, 000 iterations for untargeted attacks and
to T = 30, 000 for targeted attacks. For SimBA-DCT, we
keep the first 1/8th of all frequencies, and add an additional
1/32nd of the frequencies whenever we exhaust available
frequencies without succeeding. For both methods, we use
a fixed step size of  = 0.2.
4.2. ImageNet results
Success rate comparison (Figure 2). We demonstrate the
query efficiency of our method in comparison to the QL at-
tack – arguably the state-of-the-art black-box attack method
to date – by plotting the average success rate against the
number of queries. Figure 2 shows the comparison for
both untargeted and targeted attacks. The dotted lines show
progression of average L2-norm throughout optimization.
Both SimBA and SimBA-DCT achieve dramatically faster
increase in success rate in both untargeted and targeted sce-
narios. The average L2-norm for both methods are also
significantly lower.
Query distributions (Figure 3). In Figure 3 we plot the his-
togram of model queries made by both SimBA and SimBA-
DCT over 1000 random images. Notice that the distribu-
tions are highly right skewed so the median query count is a
much more representative aggregate statistic than average
query count. These median counts for SimBA and SimBA-
DCT are only 944 and 582, respectively. In the targeted
case, SimBA-DCT can construct an adversarial perturbation
within only 4, 854 median queries but failed to do so after
60, 000 queries for approximately 2.5% of the images. In
contrast, SimBA achieves a success rate of 100% with a
median query count of 7, 038.
This result shows a fundamental trade-off when selecting the
orthonormal basis Q. Restricting to only the low frequency
DCT basis vectors for SimBA-DCT results in faster average
rate of descent for most images, but may fail to admit an
adversarial perturbation for some images. This phenomenon
has been observed by Guo et al. (2018) for optimization-
based white-box attacks as well. Finding the right spectrum
to operate in on a per-image basis may be key to further
improving the query efficiency and success rate of black-
box attack algorithms. We leave this promising direction for
future work.
Aggregate statistics (Table 1). Table 1 computes aggregate
statistics of model queries, success rate, and perturbationL2-
norm across different attack algorithms. We reproduce the
result for LFBA, QL-attack and Bandits-TD using default
hyperparameters, and present numbers reported by the orig-
inal authors’ papers for Boundary Attack3, Opt-attack, and
AutoZOOM. The target model is a pretrained ResNet-50
(He et al., 2016) network, with the exception of AutoZOOM,
which used an Inception v3 (Szegedy et al., 2016) network.
Some of the attacks operate under the harder label-only set-
ting (i.e., only the predicted label is observed), which may
impact their query efficiency due to observation of partial
information. Nevertheless, we include these methods in the
table for completeness.
The three columns in the table show all the relevant metrics
for evaluating a black-box attack. Ideally, an attack should
succeed often, construct perturbation with low L2 norm, and
do so within very few queries. It is possible to artificially
reduce the number of model queries by lowering success
rate and/or increasing perturbation norm. To ensure fair
comparison, we enforce our methods achieve close to 100%
success rate and compare the other two metrics. Note that
the success rate for boundary attack and LFBA are always
100% since both methods begin with very large perturba-
3Result reproduced by Cheng et al. (2018)
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Figure 3. Histogram of number of queries required until a successful attack (over 1000 target images). SimBA-DCT is highly right
skewed, suggesting that only a handful of images require more than a small number of queries. The median number of queries required by
SimBA-DCT for untargeted attack is only 582. However, limiting to the low frequency basis results in SimBA-DCT failing to find a
successful adversarial image after 60, 000 queries, whereas SimBA can achieve 100% success rate consistently.
Untargeted
Attack Average queries Average L2 Success rate
Label-only
Boundary attack 123,407 5.98 100%
Opt-attack 71,100 6.98 100%
LFBA 30,000 6.34 100%
Score-based
QL-attack 28,174 8.27 85.4%
Bandits-TD 5,251 5.00 80.5%
SimBA 1,665 3.98 98.6%
SimBA-DCT 1,283 3.06 97.8%
Targeted
Attack Average queries Average L2 Success rate
Score-based
QL-attack 20,614 11.39 98.7%
AutoZOOM 13,525 26.74 100%
SimBA 7,899 9.53 100%
SimBA-DCT 8,824 7.04 96.5%
Table 1. Average query count for untargeted (left) and targeted (right) attacks on ImageNet. Methods are evaluated on three different
metrics: average number of queries until success (lower is better), average perturbation L2-norm (lower is better), and success rate
(higher is better). Both SimBA and SimBA-DCT achieve close to 100% success rate, similar to other methods in comparison, but require
significantly fewer model queries while achieving lower average L2 distortion.
tions to guarantee misclassification and gradually reduce
the perturbation norm.
Both SimBA and SimBA-DCT have significantly lower
average L2-norm than all baseline methods. For untargeted
attack, our methods require 3-4x fewer queries (at 1, 665
and 1, 232, respectively) compared to the strongest baseline
method – Bandits-TD – which only achieves a 80% success
rate. For targeted attack (right table), the evaluated methods
are much more comparable, but both SimBA and SimBA-
DCT still require significantly fewer queries than QL-attack
and AutoZOOM.
Evaluating different networks (Figure 4). To verify that
our attack is robust against different model architectures,
we evaluate SimBA and SimBA-DCT additionally against
DenseNet-121 (Huang et al., 2017a) and Inception v3
(Szegedy et al., 2016) networks. Figure 4 shows success rate
across the number of model queries for an untargeted attack
against the three different network architectures. ResNet-50
and DenseNet-121 exhibit a similar degree of vulnerability
against our attacks. However, Inception v3 is noticeably
more difficult to attack, requiring more than 10, 000 queries
to successfully attack with some images. Nevertheless, both
methods can successfully construct adversarial perturbations
against all models with high probability.
Qualitative results (Figure 5). For qualitative evaluation
of our method, we present several randomly selected im-
ages before and after adversarial perturbation by untargeted
attack. For comparison, we attack the same set of images
using QL attack. Figure 5 shows the clean and perturbed
images along with the perturbation L2-norm and number of
queries. While all attacks are highly successful at changing
the label, the norms of adversarial perturbations constructed
by SimBA and SimBA-DCT are much smaller than that of
QL attack. Both methods requires consistently fewer queries
than QL attack for almost all images. In fact, SimBA-DCT
was able to find an adversarial image in as few as 36 model
queries! Notice that the perturbation produced by SimBA
contains sparse but sharp differences, constituting a low
L0-norm attack. SimBA-DCT produces perturbations that
are sparse in frequency space, and the resulting change in
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Figure 4. Comparison of success rate versus number of model
queries across different network architectures for untargeted
SimBA (solid line) and SimBA-DCT (dashed line) attacks. Both
methods can successfully construct adversarial perturbations
within 20, 000 queries with high probability. DenseNet is the
most vulnerable against both attacks, admitting a success rate of
almost 100% after only 6,000 queries for SimBA and 4000 queries
for SimBA-DCT. Inception v3 is much more difficult to attack for
both methods.
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Figure 5. Randomly selected images before and after adversarial
perturbation by SimBA, SimBA-DCT and QL attack. The con-
structed perturbation is imperceptible for all three methods, but the
perturbation L2-norms for SimBA and SimBA-DCT are signifi-
cantly lower than that of QL attack across all images. Our methods
are capable of constructing an adversarial example in comparable
or fewer queries than QL attack – as few as 36 queries in some
cases! Zoom in for detail.
Figure 6. Plot of success rate across number of model queries for
Google Cloud Vision attack. SimBA is able to achieve close to
70% success rate after only 5000 queries, while the success rate
for LFBA has only reached 25%.
pixel space is spread out across all pixels.
4.3. Google Cloud Vision attack
To demonstrate the efficacy of our attack against real world
systems, we attack the Google Cloud Vision API, an online
machine learning service that provides labels for arbitrary
input images. For a given image, the API returns a list of top
concepts contained in the image and their associated prob-
abilities. Since the full list of probabilities associated with
every label is unavailable, we define an untargeted attack
that aims to remove the top 3 concepts in the original. We
use the maximum of the original top 3 concepts’ returned
probabilities as the adversarial loss and use SimBA to mini-
mize this loss. Figure 7 shows a sample image before and
after the attack. The original image (left) contains concepts
related to camera instruments. SimBA successfully replaced
the top concepts with weapon-related objects with imper-
ceptible change to the original image. Additional samples
are included in the supplementary material.
Since our attack can be executed efficiently, we evaluate its
effectiveness over an aggregate of 50 random images. For
the LFBA baseline, we define an attack as successful if the
produced perturbation has anL2-norm of at most the highest
L2-norm in a successful run of our attack. Figure 6 shows
the average success rate of both attacks across number of
queries. SimBA achieves a final success rate of 70% after
only 5000 API calls, while LFBA is able to succeed only
25% of the time under the same query budge. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first adversarial attack result on
Google Cloud Vision that has a high reported success rate
within very limited number of queries.
5. Related Work
Many recent studies have shown that both white-box and
black-box attacks can be applied to a diverse set of tasks.
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Figure 7. Screenshot of Google Cloud Vision labeling results on a sample image before and after adversarial perturbation. The original
image contains a set of camera instruments. The adversarial image successfully replaced the top concepts with guns and weapons. See
supplementary material for additional samples.
Computer vision models for image segmentation and object
detection have also been shown to be vulnerable against
adversarial perturbations (Cisse et al., 2017a; Xie et al.,
2017). Carlini & Wagner (2018) performed a systematic
study of speech recognition attacks and showed that robust
adversarial examples that alter the transcription model to
output arbitrary target phrases can be constructed. Attacks
on neural network policies (Huang et al., 2017b; Behzadan
& Munir, 2017) have also been shown to be permissible.
As these attacks become prevalent, many recent works have
focused on designing defenses against adversarial examples.
One common class of defenses applies an image transfor-
mation prior to classification, which aims to remove the
adversarial perturbation without changing the image content
(Xu et al., 2017; Dziugaite et al., 2016; Guo et al., 2017).
Instead of requiring the model to correctly classify all ad-
versarial images, another strategy is to detect the attack
and output an adversarial class when certain statistics of
the input appear abnormal (Li & Li, 2017; Metzen et al.,
2017; Meng & Chen, 2017; Lu et al., 2017). The training
procedure can also be strengthened by including the adver-
sarial loss as an implicit or explicit regularizer to promote
robustness against adversarial perturbations (Trame`r et al.,
2017; Madry et al., 2017; Cisse et al., 2017b). While these
defenses have shown great success against a passive adver-
sary, almost all of them can be easily defeated by modifying
the attack strategy (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a; Athalye &
Carlini, 2018; Athalye et al., 2018).
Relative to defenses against white-box attacks, few stud-
ies have focused on defending against adversaries that may
only access the model via black-box queries. While transfer
attacks can be effectively mitigated by methods such as en-
semble adversarial training (Trame`r et al., 2017) and image
transformation (Guo et al., 2017), it is unknown whether
existing defense strategies can be applied to adaptive ad-
versaries that may access the model via queries. Guo et al.
(2018) have shown that the boundary attack is susceptible
to image transformations that quantize the decision bound-
ary, but employing the attack in low frequency space can
successfully circumvent these transformation defenses.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
We proposed SimBA, a simple black-box adversarial at-
tack that takes small steps iteratively guided by continuous-
valued model output. The unprecedented query efficiency of
our method establishes a strong baseline for future research
on black-box adversarial examples. Given its real world
applicability, we hope that more effort can be dedicated
towards defending against malicious adversaries under this
more realistic threat model.
While we intentionally avoid more sophisticated techniques
to improve SimBA in favor of simplicity, we believe that
additional modifications can still dramatically decrease the
number of model queries. One possible extension could
be to further investigate the selection of different sets of
orthonormal bases, which could be crucial to the efficiency
of our method by increasing the probability of finding a
direction of large change. Another area for improvement is
the adaptive selection of the step size  to optimally consume
the distance and query budgets.
Given that our method has very few requirements, it is con-
ceptually suitable for applications to any task for which the
target model returns a continuous score for the prediction.
For instance, speech recognition systems are trained to max-
imize the probability of the correct transcription (Amodei
et al., 2016), and policy networks (Mnih et al., 2015) are
trained to maximize some reward function over the set of
actions conditioned on the current environment. A simple
iterative algorithm that modifies the input at random may
prove to be effective in these scenarios. We leave these
directions for future work.
Simple Black-box Adversarial Attacks
References
Amodei, D., Ananthanarayanan, S., Anubhai, R., Bai, J.,
Battenberg, E., Case, C., Casper, J., Catanzaro, B., Chen,
J., Chrzanowski, M., Coates, A., Diamos, G., Elsen, E.,
Engel, J., Fan, L., Fougner, C., Hannun, A. Y., Jun,
B., Han, T., LeGresley, P., Li, X., Lin, L., Narang, S.,
Ng, A. Y., Ozair, S., Prenger, R., Qian, S., Raiman, J.,
Satheesh, S., Seetapun, D., Sengupta, S., Wang, C., Wang,
Y., Wang, Z., Xiao, B., Xie, Y., Yogatama, D., Zhan, J.,
and Zhu, Z. Deep speech 2 : End-to-end speech recogni-
tion in english and mandarin. In Proceedings of the 33nd
International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML
2016, New York City, NY, USA, June 19-24, 2016, pp.
173–182, 2016.
Athalye, A. and Carlini, N. On the robustness of the CVPR
2018 white-box adversarial example defenses. CoRR,
abs/1804.03286, 2018.
Athalye, A., Carlini, N., and Wagner, D. A. Obfuscated
gradients give a false sense of security: Circumventing
defenses to adversarial examples. CoRR, abs/1802.00420,
2018.
Behzadan, V. and Munir, A. Vulnerability of deep rein-
forcement learning to policy induction attacks. CoRR,
abs/1701.04143, 2017.
Brendel, W., Rauber, J., and Bethge, M. Decision-based
adversarial attacks: Reliable attacks against black-box
machine learning models. CoRR, abs/1712.04248, 2017.
Carlini, N. and Wagner, D. A. Adversarial examples are not
easily detected: Bypassing ten detection methods. CoRR,
abs/1705.07263, 2017a.
Carlini, N. and Wagner, D. A. Towards evaluating the
robustness of neural networks. In IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy, pp. 39–57, 2017b.
Carlini, N. and Wagner, D. A. Audio adversarial ex-
amples: Targeted attacks on speech-to-text. CoRR,
abs/1801.01944, 2018.
Chen, P., Zhang, H., Sharma, Y., Yi, J., and Hsieh, C. ZOO:
zeroth order optimization based black-box attacks to deep
neural networks without training substitute models. In
Proceedings of the 10th ACM Workshop on Artificial
Intelligence and Security, AISec@CCS 2017, Dallas, TX,
USA, November 3, 2017, pp. 15–26, 2017. doi: 10.1145/
3128572.3140448.
Cheng, M., Le, T., Chen, P., Yi, J., Zhang, H., and Hsieh,
C. Query-efficient hard-label black-box attack: An
optimization-based approach. CoRR, abs/1807.04457,
2018.
Cisse, M., Adi, Y., Neverova, N., and Keshet, J. Hou-
dini: Fooling deep structured prediction models. CoRR,
abs/1707.05373, 2017a.
Cisse, M., Bojanowski, P., Grave, E., Dauphin, Y., and
Usunier, N. Parseval networks: Improving robustness to
adversarial examples. CoRR, abs/1704.08847, 2017b.
Dziugaite, G. K., Ghahramani, Z., and Roy, D. A study
of the effect of JPG compression on adversarial images.
CoRR, abs/1608.00853, 2016.
Fawzi, A., Fawzi, H., and Fawzi, O. Adversarial vulnerabil-
ity for any classifier. In Advances in Neural Information
Processing Systems 31: Annual Conference on Neural
Information Processing Systems 2018, NeurIPS 2018, 3-
8 December 2018, Montre´al, Canada., pp. 1186–1195,
2018.
Goodfellow, I., Shlens, J., and Szegedy, C. Explaining and
harnessing adversarial examples. In Proc. ICLR, 2015.
Guo, C., Rana, M., Cisse´, M., and van der Maaten, L. Coun-
tering adversarial images using input transformations.
CoRR, abs/1711.00117, 2017.
Guo, C., Frank, J. S., and Weinberger, K. Q. Low frequency
adversarial perturbations. CoRR, abs/1809.08758, 2018.
He, K., Zhang, X., Ren, S., and Sun, J. Deep residual
learning for image recognition. In Proc. CVPR, pp. 770–
778, 2016.
Huang, G., Liu, Z., Weinberger, K., and van der Maaten,
L. Densely connected convolutional networks. In Proc.
CVPR, pp. 2261–2269, 2017a.
Huang, S., Papernot, N., Goodfellow, I., Duan, Y., and
Abbeel, P. Adversarial attacks on neural network policies.
CoRR, abs/1702.02284, 2017b.
Ilyas, A., Engstrom, L., Athalye, A., and Lin, J. Black-
box adversarial attacks with limited queries and informa-
tion. In Proceedings of the 35th International Conference
on Machine Learning, ICML 2018, Stockholmsma¨ssan,
Stockholm, Sweden, July 10-15, 2018, pp. 2142–2151,
2018a.
Ilyas, A., Engstrom, L., and Madry, A. Prior convictions:
Black-box adversarial attacks with bandits and priors.
CoRR, abs/1807.07978, 2018b.
Kurakin, A., Goodfellow, I., and Bengio, S. Adversarial
machine learning at scale. CoRR, abs/1611.01236, 2016.
Li, X. and Li, F. Adversarial examples detection in deep
networks with convolutional filter statistics. In IEEE In-
ternational Conference on Computer Vision, ICCV 2017,
Venice, Italy, October 22-29, 2017, pp. 5775–5783, 2017.
doi: 10.1109/ICCV.2017.615.
Simple Black-box Adversarial Attacks
Lu, J., Issaranon, T., and Forsyth, D. A. Safetynet: Detecting
and rejecting adversarial examples robustly. In IEEE In-
ternational Conference on Computer Vision, ICCV 2017,
Venice, Italy, October 22-29, 2017, pp. 446–454, 2017.
doi: 10.1109/ICCV.2017.56.
Madry, A., Makelov, A., Schmidt, L., Tsipras, D., and
Vladu, A. Towards deep learning models resistant to
adversarial attacks. CoRR, abs/1706.06083, 2017.
Meng, D. and Chen, H. Magnet: A two-pronged defense
against adversarial examples. In Proceedings of the 2017
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Commu-
nications Security, CCS 2017, Dallas, TX, USA, Octo-
ber 30 - November 03, 2017, pp. 135–147, 2017. doi:
10.1145/3133956.3134057.
Metzen, J. H., Genewein, T., Fischer, V., and Bischoff,
B. On detecting adversarial perturbations. CoRR,
abs/1702.04267, 2017.
Mnih, V., Kavukcuoglu, K., Silver, D., Rusu, A. A., Ve-
ness, J., Bellemare, M. G., Graves, A., Riedmiller, M. A.,
Fidjeland, A., Ostrovski, G., Petersen, S., Beattie, C.,
Sadik, A., Antonoglou, I., King, H., Kumaran, D., Wier-
stra, D., Legg, S., and Hassabis, D. Human-level control
through deep reinforcement learning. Nature, 518(7540):
529–533, 2015. doi: 10.1038/nature14236.
Moosavi-Dezfooli, S., Fawzi, A., and Frossard, P. Deep-
fool: A simple and accurate method to fool deep neural
networks. In Proc. CVPR, pp. 2574–2582, 2016.
Moosavi-Dezfooli, S.-M., Fawzi, A., Fawzi, O., and
Frossard, P. Universal adversarial perturbations. In Proc.
CVPR, pp. 86–94, 2017.
Shafahi, A., Huang, W. R., Studer, C., Feizi, S., and Gold-
stein, T. Are adversarial examples inevitable? CoRR,
abs/1809.02104, 2018.
Szegedy, C., Zaremba, W., Sutskever, I., Bruna, J., Erhan,
D., Goodfellow, I., and Fergus, R. Intriguing properties
of neural networks. In In Proc. ICLR, 2014.
Szegedy, C., Vanhoucke, V., Ioffe, S., Shlens, J., and Wojna,
Z. Rethinking the inception architecture for computer
vision. In Proc. CVPR, pp. 2818–2826, 2016.
Trame`r, F., Kurakin, A., Papernot, N., Boneh, D., and Mc-
Daniel, P. D. Ensemble adversarial training: Attacks and
defenses. CoRR, abs/1705.07204, 2017.
Tu, C., Ting, P., Chen, P., Liu, S., Zhang, H., Yi, J., Hsieh,
C., and Cheng, S. Autozoom: Autoencoder-based zeroth
order optimization method for attacking black-box neural
networks. CoRR, abs/1805.11770, 2018.
Xie, C., Wang, J., Zhang, Z., Zhou, Y., Xie, L., and Yuille,
A. L. Adversarial examples for semantic segmentation
and object detection. In ICCV, pp. 1378–1387. IEEE
Computer Society, 2017.
Xu, W., Evans, D., and Qi, Y. Feature squeezing: Detecting
adversarial examples in deep neural networks. CoRR,
abs/1704.01155, 2017.
